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Rule of Law 
Legal rights of shareholders and creditors to receive certain cash flows and to participate 
in various corporate decision-making activities, though necessary but are not sufficient 
conditions for effective corporate governance. A climate of respect for the rule of law is 
also needed. Thus, a core set of shareholder and creditor rights and an established 
tradition of legal enforcement of these rights are complementary features of an effective 
system of corporate governance. The following five enforcements variables define the 
rule of a law in a country, in addition to the quality of accounting standards: 
 
1. The efficiency of the judicial system 
 
2. An assessment of the law and order tradition 
 
3. An index of government corruption 
 
4. The risk of expropriation 
 
5. The risk of reputation of a contract by the government 
 
 
II. LEGAL REFORM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
INDIA 
 
1. Corporate Governance: Problem in India 
 
In India, the majority of companies, even the listed ones, are family controlled. The 
controlling shareholder is involved in management either directly or indirectly. The 
financial institutions, which hold shares for portfolio purposes, may provide a monitoring 
but not operational role, so they are not considered controlling shareholders. This 
concentrated ownership generates serious problems for minority shareholders and has a 
depressing effect on the economic growth. There are potential costs of minority 
shareholders in companies in which there is a controlling shareholder. The presence of a 
controlling position gives management an entrenched position. If decisions are made that 
do not benefit all shareholders and thus depress share price, the market for corporate 
control and the market for managers cannot operate to discipline poor managerial 
performance. If one goes by the principal-agent concept, the misalignment of interests of 
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management and shareholders arises due to small ownership of managers. If there is 
professional management, the controlling shareholder monitors management carefully. 
Thus, with the increased holdings of equity, the alignment of interests of managers and 
shareholders improves and minority shareholders are not negatively impacted. 
 
Given that there can be serious problems with concentrated holdings, can the corporate 
governance system be expected to solve these problems? Under the market-based system, 
the usual market solutions are not feasible due to size of managerial equity holdings. The 
board of directors may be concerned about shareholders, but they cannot be expected to 
be effective. However, a more diligent and independent board would help to resolve this 
problem. One potential solution is the equity market which, as a result of a lower share 
price for a poorly performing company, will provide discipline if the company intends to 
issue equity. The other disciplining factor is a competitive product market. With 
competition in the product market, decisions by controlling shareholder which do not 
maximize value, will ultimately lead to poor financial performance, financial distress and 
either bankruptcy, reorganization, or merger. This solution can take a long time but is 
assisted by pro-competitive policies within the economy including facilitating 
international competition in product and capital markets. Where markets forces do not 
work, there is a need for an effective corporate law to protect shareholders against 
oppression and a set of other minority shareholder protection provisions that can protect 
them. These protections include minority shareholder approval of important decisions in 
general meetings. 
 
In the bank-based systems, just as in the market-based system, the solution is a 
competitive product market and its impact on the efficient operations of the companies. 
Aided by pro-competitive policies of the government in removing barriers and opening 
markets to internal and external competition, the product market can resolve many of the 
problems observed in closely held and family managed companies. 
 
Financial Institutions may also become increasingly active in corporate governance and 
closely monitor corporate performance through effective use of their proxy or through 
informal discussions with board members or management. This may result in greater 
pressure on management to make operational and investment decisions that would 
increase the value of the shareholders’ wealth. Another influence of shareholder activism 
will be the performance of the overall stock market. If the stock market generates large 
returns, there is no shareholder activism. However, the long decline in the market forces 
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shareholders to find ways to increase the share price of their companies. Poor equity 
performance also shakes the foundation for the cross-holdings of shares. Corporations 
would accept a low rate of return on their portfolio investment as a cross holding in 
exchange for long-term business returns. 
 
In this scenario, the international institutional investors will also be important as they can 
have significant impact on the company’s operations and decision-making. Poor 
economic conditions also put pressure on governments to change regulations and on 
companies to alter their operations and structures.8
 
 
2. Legal History of Corporate Governance in India 
 
Family owned business houses in India followed a particular style of governance, which 
suited their personal interests. The stakeholders considered them as acronyms of 
competence and trust. The meager holding of the families in their company’s capital, 
non-transparency in company operation at various levels and matters and superficial 
show of professionalism on the board with no public disclosure did not bring any 
effective intervention by stakeholders in a protected economy till the seventies in India. 
Non-separation of ownership from the management generated corruption in business and 
resulted in denial of enhancement in the value to the stakeholders’ investment. 
 
Since 1988, the fundamental concern of corporate governance, however, has remained to 
ensure the means by which a company’s managers are held accountable to capital 
providers for an efficient use of assets of the company. The last five years have, 
nevertheless, witnessed a proliferation of corporate governance guidelines, reports and 
codes designed to improve the transparency in company operations and focus on liability 
of directors and to hold them accountable. Although, the board of directors provide an 
important mechanism for holding management accountable, effective corporate 
governance still has to be supported by and is dependent on capital market for corporate 
control, securities regulation, company law, accounting and auditing standards, 
bankruptcy laws, stock exchange listing rules and judicial enforcements. 
 
The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), 9  in 1998, framed a Voluntary Code of 
Corporate Governance for listed companies and made a small beginning in corporate 
governance. The CII Code recommended that key information must be reported half 
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yearly to shareholders. Listed companies should have audit committees, corporates to 
give a statement on value addition, and consolidation of accounts of subsidiary 
companies to be optional. 
 
The Unit Trust of India, in 1999,10 also formulated a self-governance code of corporate 
governance, and this was followed by the professional bodies like the Institute of 
Company Secretaries of India (ICSI) to focus the attention of the Indian corporate sector 
on the imperative need to evolve new norms of governance to ensure sustained 
development of Indian industries on healthy lines. 
 
The Security and Exchange Board of India,11  (SEBI) on 7 May 1999, constituted a 
Committee on Corporate Governance, with 18 members under the chairmanship of Shri 
Kumar Managalam Birla, to promote and raise the standards of corporate governance in 
respect of listed companies. This Committee, after a good deal of deliberations with 
industrial associations and professional bodies, submitted its report on 25 January 2000. 
The Committee’s primary aim was to view corporate governance from the perspective of 
investors and shareholders and to prepare a code suited to Indian corporate environment. 
 
The Committee recommended various new norms for corporate governance. SEBI 
accepted the recommendations and enforced them by requiring Stock Exchange to 
include clause 49 in the Standard Listing Agreement. This clause-49 was required to be 
implemented by all stock exchanges and adopted by all listed companies, within a time 
frame of three years commencing from the financial year 2000-2001. 12  The main 
recommendations of this Committee related to: (a) composition of the board of directors, 
including independent directors, (b) constitution of audit committee to look into the 
financial aspects of a company, (c) remuneration of directors, (d) director’s report to 
include management discussion & analysis report, (e) better disclosure norms to the 
shareholders through annual report, etc. 
 
The company law, 1956 was also amended by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2000, 
which introduced many provisions relating to corporate governance like additional 
ground of disqualification of directors, setting up of audit committees, inclusion of 
director’s responsibility statement in the director’s report and the introduction of 
mandatory postal ballot for specified items of business in the general meeting. This was a 
novel feature in India. 
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Corporate governance was also introspected by an Advisory Group constituted by the 
Standing Committee on International Finance Standards and Codes of the Reserve Bank 
of India13 under the Chairmanship of Dr. Y.V.Reddy, the then Deputy Governor, who 
later became Governor of the Reserve Bank of India. These efforts focused the attention 
of the corporate boards that they should manage the affairs of companies with better 
accountability to shareholders and achieve transparency of operations with disclosure of 
both financial and non-financial data through annual report and other periodical reports. 
As a result, annual report of listed Indian companies, now reflect in adequate measure the 
new norms of governance. 
 
After the Enron debacle in 2001, which revealed a hand-in-glove relationship between the 
auditors and the corporate clients and various other scams in the United States, such as 
Worldcom, Qwest, Global Crossing, and the auditing lacunae that eventually led to the 
collapse of Andersen, led to the enactment of the stringent Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX 
Act) in the United States in 2002. The Act brought with it fundamental changes in 
virtually every area of corporate governance – and particularly in auditor independence, 
corporate responsibility, enhanced financial disclosures, and severe penalties, both fines 
and imprisonment, for wilful default by managers and auditors. It is fair to predict that the 
SOX Act will do more to change the contours of board structure, auditing, financial 
reporting and corporate disclosure than any other previous law in the US history. 
 
These factors and development in the United States led the Department of Company 
Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India in August 2002, to appoint a High 
Level Committee popularly known as the Naresh Chandra Committee to examine various 
corporate governance issues and to recommend changes in the diverse areas involving the 
auditor-client relationships and the role of independent directors. The Committee 
submitted its Report on 23 December 2002 to the Government. 
 
In its report, the Committee commented on existence of a poor structure and composition 
of the board of directors of Indian companies, scant fiduciary responsibility of directors, 
poor disclosures and transparency norms, and inadequate accounting and auditing 
standards. The Committee stressed the need for experts to go through the minutest details 
of transactions among the companies, banks, financial institutions, and capital markets 
etc. The Committee also observed that the performance of many companies with regard 
to corporate governance standards is far from satisfactory. On the auditor– company 
relationship, the Committee recommended that the proprietary of auditors rendering non-
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audit services is a complex area, which needs to be carefully dealt with. The 
recommendations of this Committee were more or less in line with the Rules framed by 
the SEC of USA in accordance with the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. If 
implemented, the Committee’s recommendations will have far-reaching effects on 
corporate governance. 
 
In the year 2002 SEBI also analyzed the statistics of compliance with clause 49 by listed 
companies. It felt that there was a need to look beyond the mere systems and procedures, 
if corporate governance was to be made effective in protecting the interests of investors. 
SEBI, therefore, constituted a committee under the chairmanship of N.R.Narayana 
Murthy, Chairman, Infosys Technologies Ltd. to review the corporate governance code 
by listed companies and issue revised clause 49 based on its recommendations. The 
Committee included representatives from the stock exchanges, chambers of commerce 
and industry, academicians, investor associations and professional bodies. 
 
The Narayana Murthy Committee submitted its report on 8 February, 2003. On the basis 
of the recommendations of the Committee, SEBI revised clause 49 of the Listing 
Agreement, so as to promote and raise the standards of corporate governance.14 In the 
meantime many of the recommendations of the Naresh Chandra Committee were 
enforced in the form of the Companies (Amendment) Bill of 2003, which was introduced 
in the Parliament on May 2003. The bill has been withdrawn and Cabinet has directed to 
re-examine its provisions in the light of several practical problems posed by the Industry 
in the implementation of the provisions of the bill especially as to Composition of Board 
of Directors with majority of independent director. 
 
The government, earlier on, had a thinking that corporate excellence is a way ahead of 
corporate governance. So, the Department of Company Affairs (DCA) on May 15, 2000 
appointed a Study Group under the chairmanship of Dr. P.L. Sanjeeva Reddy, Secretary 
DCA to suggest ways and means of achieving corporate excellence and to explore the 
possibility of putting in place an implementable system and also to develop a firm 
infrastructure.15 This study group constituted a Task Force under the Chairmanship of S. 
Rajagopalan, former Chairman, MTNL. This Task Force inter-acted with the delegates of 
Commonwealth Secretariat on Centre for Corporate Governance, various chambers of 
commerce and the professional bodies. The key recommendations of the study group 
were: 
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(i) Setting up an independent autonomous ‘centre for corporate excellence’, with 
a view to accord accreditation to promote policy research and studies, training 
and education awards, etc. In the field of corporate excellence, through 
improved corporate governance. 
 
(ii) Introducing measures for greater shareholders’ participation, through multiple 
location meetings, and electronic media, etc. 
 
(iii) Introducing recognition of corporate social responsibility with Triple-bottom 
Line Accounting and Reporting. 
 
(iv) Clearer distinction between direction and management to ensure that 
executive directors are held responsible for legal and other compliance with 
non-executive directors being charged with strategic and overall 
responsibilities. 
 
(v) Highlighting directors’ commitment and accountability through fewer and 
more focused board and committee membership, tighter independence criteria 
and minimization of interest-conflict potential. 
 
(vi) Suggesting application of corporate governance principles to public sector 
undertakings both in the listed and even unlisted companies and upgrading 
their board with independent directors. 
 
Corporate Governance sine-qua-non for Corporate Success: 
Before going into details of the analysis of the different committees, it is necessary to 
look at some of the observations, which support the view that corporate governance is a 
sine qua non for corporate success. In the Foreword to the Report of the Rahul Bajaj 
Committee on Corporate Governance in India, (CII Report, 1998) Shekar Datta, the then 
President, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) said that: 
 
 “Corporate Governance is a phrase which implies transparency of 
management systems in business and industry, be it private sector, public 
sector or the financial institutions. Just as industry seeks transparency in 
government policies and procedures, so also, the debate on corporate 
governance seeks transparency in the corporate sector.” 
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The Committee, which recommended the “Desirable Corporate Governance Code”, also 
stated that “there is a global consensus about the objective of “good corporate 
governance: maximizing long-term share holder value.” 
 
Shri Narayana Murthy in his Report observed that: 
 “Corporate governance is beyond the realm of law. It stems from the culture 
and mindset of the management and cannot be regulated by legislation alone. 
Corporate governance means the conducting the affairs of a company in such 
a way that there is fairness to all stakeholders and its actions benefits the 
greatest number of stakeholders. It is all about openness, integrity and 
accountability.” 
 
He also stated that: 
 
 “Corporate governance is the key element in improving the economic 
efficiency of a company and makes the Board accountable to shareholders. 
The failure to implement corporate governance can have a heavy cost beyond 
regulatory problems. Companies that do not employ good governance can pay 
a significant risk premium when competing for scarce capital in the public 
markets. The credibility offered by corporate governance also helps to 
maintain the confidence of both the foreign and domestic investors, which 
helps in attracting more patient long term capital and also will reduce the cost 
of capital.” 
 
Corporate governance, thus, denotes the process, structure and relationship through which 
the Board of Directors oversees what the management does. It is also about being 
answerable to different stakeholders. 
 
 
3. Status of Corporate Governance and Law Reform 
 
Corporate Governance has been a buzzword in India since the year 1998. The 
introduction of clause 49 in the Listing Agreement on the basis of the Kumar Managalam 
Birla Committee Report, constituted in May 1999 by the SEBI have met with 
encouraging success, since most of the ‘A’ Group companies listed on BSE (Bombay 
68
Stock Exchange) and NSE (National Stock Exchange) have complied with the norms 
recommended by the Committee. The recommendations, divided into mandatory and 
non-mandatory compliance, have been made applicable to all listed companies, their 
directors, management, employees and professionals associated with these companies. 
 
However, the corporate governance has remained more on paper is clear from the Report 
on Corporate Governance by the Advisory Group constituted by the Standing Committee 
on International Financial Standards and Codes of the Reserve Bank of India.16  The 
following facts emerged from the Report: 
 
(i) The predominant form of corporate governance in India is ‘insider model’ 
where promoters dominate governance in every possible way. Indian 
corporates which reflect the pure ‘outsider model’ are relatively small in 
number. 
 
(ii) A distinguishing feature of the Indian Diaspora is the implicit acceptance that 
corporate entities belong to founding families. 
 
(iii) The listing agreement, the main instrument, through which SEBI ensures 
implementation of corporate governance, is a weak instrument, as its penal 
provisions are not stringent. The maximum penalty a stock exchange can 
impose on any company that does not follow the corporate governance norms 
is suspension of trading in its shares. This penalty hurts the investor 
community more than the management of the company that violates the listing 
agreement. 
 
(iv) Regional stock exchanges where a large number of companies are listed lack 
effective organization and skills to monitor effective compliance with 
corporate governance norms. 
 
(v) A vast majority of companies that are not listed remain outside the purview of 
SEBI’s measures. 
 
(vi) The financial institutions that have large shareholdings in most of the listed 
companies have been passive observers in the area of corporate governance 
and do not effectively exercise their rights as shareholders. 
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(vii) The autonomy of the boards of Public Sector Units (PSUs) and public sector 
banks has seriously eroded due to special legislative provisions or 
notifications, day to day interference by the concerned administrative 
ministries, undermining thereby the necessary degree of autonomy. 
 
Besides the above discouraging facts, the securities scam of 2002 that followed the same 
modus operandi as the scam of 1992 exposed the hollowness of the surveillance and 
enforcement of the Companies Act and the Listing Agreement. It is interesting to point 
out here that corporate governance in the form of clause 49 was already introduced in the 
year 2000. 
 
Recent events in Indian stock exchanges have also exposed the hollow ethics of many of 
the Indian corporates and revealed following malpractices and frauds: 
 
(i) Rampant insider trading by the promoters in league with big market players. 
 
(ii) Massive price rigging/ manipulation by the promoters in league with big 
market players prior to mergers and takeovers. 
 
(iii) Gross misuse of bank funds for clandestine stock market operations. 
 
(iv) Criminally motivated investment in violation of laid down norms. 
 
(v) Many companies, which raised money from the capital market through public 
issues, have not paid any dividend for more than five years. 
 
(vi) The total amount of money duped by the vanishing companies (companies 
vanished after collecting monies through the public offerings) is calculated to 
be Rs 668,610 millions;; 
 
(vii) Non-performing assets of scheduled commercial banks amounted to Rs 
585,540 millions as on 31 March 2003. 
 
In addition small investors have lost their hard earned money in the stock markets for the 
following reasons: 
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(i) Lack of ethics, selfish conscience, and breach of trust on the part of the 
promoters. 
 
(ii) Lack of adequate compliance mechanism, supervision, proper inspection, 
effective regulation and preventive action by regulators like Department of 
Company Affairs, Registrar of Companies, Board of Stock Exchanges as well 
as SEBI. 
 
(iii) Lack of professional ethics on the part of professionals like Chartered 
Accountants, Company Secretaries etc, who are holding onerous positions in 
companies. 
 
(iv) Inadequate powers of SEBI – the premier market regulator to punish the 
violators. 
 
Thus, no matter that most of the companies may be fully complying with the corporate 
governance norms laid down by clause 49, but the spirit and good conscience on the part 
of the promoters to observe ethical practices remained only on paper. Moreover, clause 
49 the case of listed companies, non-listed companies are out of its purview. 
 
A number of proposals have been made to improve corporate governance. The various 
suggested reforms include strengthening the position of internal and outside auditors; 
allowing mergers and acquisitions approved by a panel; requiring more independent 
outside directors on boards; introducing the supervisory board or two-tier system; 
allowing banks to own greater equity in shares of the companies; enhanced disclosure 
through consolidated balance sheets and enforcement of accounting standards. However, 
one of the most important ways in which the management of a corporation may be 
monitored is by an effective enforcement of capital market discipline. It involves the 
possibility of outside shareholders being able to displace poorly performing management, 
even in companies, where management possesses a significant (though not controlling) 
share ownership. It shall also permit shareholders, whose collective voice is hard to 
mobilize, some control by exercising their right of exit. The only mechanism required to 
make the capital market discipline is liberalization of restrictions on mergers and 
acquisitions, along with the bankruptcy provisions be allowed to operate without any 
government interference. One important commitment by the government, however, is that 
it will discontinue directed lending and permit commercial banks and government 
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financial institutions to be run by their boards in the interest of their shareholders rather 
than the government. 
 
In India, the four clusters of legal arrangements have been developed to respond to 
corporate governance problems. These are securities market regulations, the fiduciary 
responsibilities of directors and officers, laws governing takeovers, and rules governing 
shareholder voice. The major laws, which govern the corporate sector, are: 
 
 the Companies Act, 1956; the SEBI Act, 1992; the Securities Contracts 
(Regulation) Act, 1956; the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 
(FEMA); the Depositories Act, 1996; the Debt Recovery Act 1993; the 
Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988; the Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act 1996; the Indian Penal Code, 1860; the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872; the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885; the Consumer 
Protection Act, 1986; the Competition Act, 2002; and the Securitization and 
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 
2002. 
 
The two most important laws that control the listed companies are the Securities 
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 which regulate all new public offerings, dealings in 
stock market and the functioning of the stock exchanges in India and the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 which created the Securities and Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI), giving it the authority to administer the Securities Contracts (Regulation) 
Act, and all the other regulation of securities. 
 
The major purpose of all these laws is to require regular, accurate, and timely public 
disclosure of financial information by any company that issued publicly traded securities 
and to instill public confidence in the reliability and accuracy of information so reported. 
A new law called the Indian Competition Act, 2002 has been enacted to replace the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, 1969. The objective of the new 
law is to prevent practices having adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain 
competition in markets, to protect the interest of consumers and to ensure freedom of 
trade carried on by other participants in markets, in India, and for matters connected 
therewith or incidental thereto. 
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The Companies Act, 1956, and the Listing Agreement 
The opening up of the Indian economy and the necessity to have good corporate 
governance, made the government of India to take number of steps through suitable 
provisions in the Companies Act, 1956 and through the Listing Agreement. ‘Listing’ 
denotes registration of a security as officially approved for dealing or trading on the stock 
exchange. A public company has no obligation to have its shares listed on a stock 
exchange. But if a company intends to offer its shares or debentures to the public for 
subscription by the issue of a prospectus, it must, before issuing such prospectus, apply to 
recognized stock exchange for permission to have the shares or debentures intended to be 
so offered to the public to be dealt within the stock exchange in terms of section 73 of the 
Companies Act, 1956. Thus, section 73 of the Companies Act makes listing compulsory 
where a company makes a public issue of shares or debentures by prospectus. It may be 
noted that Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 does not make the listing of 
securities compulsory. 
 
The listing agreement is required to be complied by only listed companies with stock 
exchanges in which the concerned company’s shares are listed. While the requirements in 
relation to corporate governance set out in the Companies Act apply to all companies and 
the Department of Company Affairs, Government of India administers the Companies 
Act, the listing agreement applied to listed companies, is administered by stock 
exchanges under the supervision of SEBI, i.e., under the Securities Contracts 
(Regulation) Act, 1956 and the SEBI Act, 1992. The requirements in the listing 
agreement have been inserted through the directives issued by the SEBI to which the 
Ministry of Finance has delegated powers. A numbers of requirements under the 
Companies Act and in the listing agreement are uniform, but on some major issues, 
which include the composition of the board, they vary. This obviously creates practical 
problems for listed companies.17
 
The regulation of the Indian capital market and listed companies began in 1992 with an 
impressive corpus of regulatory law being laid out. SEBI was statutorily empowered to 
regulate market intermediaries so as to better protect the integrity of transactions and 
thereby create investor confidence. SEBI’s powers were further reinforced by transferring 
to it virtually all-substantive powers earlier vested in the Finance Ministry of the 
Government. 
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SEBI acts as a supervisor of the system undertaking supervision of the activities of 
various market participants. SEBI has put a modern regulatory framework with rules and 
regulations governing the behaviour of major market participants such as stock exchanges, 
brokers, merchant bankers, and mutual funds. It also regulates activities such as takeovers 
and insider trading which have implications for investor protection. SEBI liberalized the 
regulation of new issues, including allowing book building. It also increased information 
requirements for listed shares. The governing structure of stock exchanges has also been 
modified to make the boards of exchanges more broad based and less dominated by 
brokers. 
 
 
4. Recommendations of Naresh Chandra Committee on Corporate Audit and 
Governance 
 
On 21 August 2002, the Department of Company Affairs, Ministry of Finance and 
Company Affairs appointed a High Level Committee under the Chairmanship of Naresh 
Chandra to examine various corporate governance issues. Among others, this Committee 
was entrusted to analyse and recommend changes, if necessary, in diverse areas such as: 
 
(i) the statutory auditor-company relationship to further strengthen the 
professional nature of this interface; 
 
(ii) the need, if any, for rotation of statutory audit firms or partners; 
 
(iii) the procedure for appointment of auditors and determination of audit fees; 
(iv) restrictions, if necessary on non-audit fees; 
 
(v) independence of auditing functions; 
 
(vi) measures required to ensure that the management and companies actually 
present ‘true and fair’ statement of the financial affairs of the companies; 
 
(vii) the need to consider measures such as certification of accounts and financial 
statements by management and directors; 
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(viii) the necessity of having a transparent system of random scrutiny of audited 
accounts; 
 
(ix) adequacy of regulation of chartered accountants, company secretaries and 
other similar statutory oversight functionaries; 
 
(x) advantages, if any, of setting up an independent regulator similar to the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight board in the Sarbanes – Oxley (SOX) Act of 
United States, and if so, its constitution; and 
 
(xi) the role of independent directors and how their independence and 
effectiveness can be ensured. 
 
The Committee, in its report, recognized that while the listed companies in India are 
required to follow very stringent guidelines on corporate governance, there is a wide gap 
between prescription and practice. The committee’s recommendations were greatly 
influenced by the SOX Act of the United States. The Committee after having good 
deliberations with chambers of commerce and professional bodies, made significant 
recommendations for changes in the Companies Act. Its recommendations were related to 
audit (recommendation 2) auditing the auditors (recommendation 3), independent 
directors (recommendation 4) and other miscellaneous recommendations, to make the 
SEBI more effective. 
 
In line with the international best practices, the Committee, among others recommended 
the following disqualifications for audit assignments (Recommendation 2.1): 
 
(i) Prohibition of any direct financial interest in the audit client by the audit firm, 
its partners or members of the engagement team as well as their ‘direct 
relatives’; 
 
(ii) Prohibition of receiving any loan and/or guarantee from or on behalf of the 
audit client; 
 
(iii) Prohibition of any business relationship with the audit client; 
 
(iv) Prohibition of any personal relationship; 
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(v) Prohibition of service during the cooling off period of two years for both the 
audit firm as well as audit client; 
 
(vi) Prohibition of fee restriction. Fee should not exceed 25% of the total revenue 
from single client and its subsidiaries and affiliates. 
 
In addition, an audit firm shall not provide the following non-audit services to an audit 
client (recommendation 2.2): 
 
(i) Accounting and book keeping services; 
 
(ii) Internal audit services; 
 
(iii) Financial information system design and its implementation, including 
services related to IT systems for preparing financial or management 
accounts; 
 
(iv) Actuarial services; 
 
(v) Broker, dealer, investment adviser or investment banking services; 
 
(vi) Outsourced financial services; 
 
(vii) Management functions, including provision of temporary staff; 
 
(viii) Valuation services and fairness opinion; 
 
(ix) Any other services, other than audit and above-mentioned prohibited services, 
should be done only with the approval of the audit committee. 
 
Auditor disclosure of contingent liabilities (recommendation 2.5): Management should 
provide a clear description of each material liability and its risks followed by the auditors 
comments on the management view. It should be highlighted in the significant accounting 
policies and noted on accounts as well as in the auditor’s report, if necessary. 
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Auditor’s disclosure of qualifications and consequent action (recommendation 2.6): 
Qualifications to accounts if any, must form a distinct section of the auditor’s report to 
the shareholders. It is also mandatory for auditor to send a copy of qualified report to the 
Registrar of Companies, SEBI and the principal stock exchange along with a copy of 
letter sent to the management. 
 
Management’s certification in the event of auditor’s replacement (recommendation 
2.7):A special resolution will be required if an auditor who is eligible for re-appointment 
is replaced. The explanatory statement should disclose the reasons for such replacement 
that shall be verified by audit committee as ‘true and fair’. 
 
Auditors’ Annual Certificate of independence (recommendation 2.8): Auditors, before 
agreeing to be appointed, must submit a certificate of independence to the Audit 
Committee or Board that they are independent and have arm’s length relationship with 
the client company and they are not engaged in any non-audit services or are not 
otherwise disqualified. 
 
Appointment of auditors (recommendation 2.9): The Audit committee should discuss 
the annual work programme, review the independence of the audit firm and recommend 
with reasons the appointment or re-appointment or removal of external auditor and 
annual audit remuneration. 
 
CEO and CFO Certification of Annual Audited Accounts (recommendation 2.10): 
Chief executive officer and chief finance officer shall certify that, 
 
(i) they have reviewed the balance sheet and profit and loss account and all its 
schedules and notes on accounts, the cash flow statement and the Directors’ 
Report; 
 
(ii) these statements do not contain any material untrue statement or omit any 
material fact nor do they contain statements that might be misleading; 
 
(iii) these statements together represent a true and fair view of the financial and 
operational state of the company and are in compliance with the existing 
accounting standards and/or applicable laws and regulations; 
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(iv) they are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls which 
have been designed to ensure that all material information is periodically 
made known to them, and have evaluated the effectiveness of internal control 
systems of the company; 
 
(v) they have disclosed to the auditors and the audit committee any deficiencies in 
the design or operation of internal controls; instances of significant fraud 
involving management or employees; significant changes in internal control 
and accounting policies during the year; 
 
(vi) they will return to the company that part of any bonus or incentive or equity 
based compensation that was inflated on account of such errors as decided by 
the audit committee. 
 
Auditing the Auditors (Recommendations from Chapter 3 of the Report): The 
Committee recommended that three independent Quality Review Boards (QRB) should 
be established, one each for the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), the 
Institute of Company Secretaries of India, (ICSI), and Institute of Cost and Work 
Accountants of India (ICWAI) to periodically examine and review the quality of audit, 
secretarial and cost accounting firms and pass judgement and comments on the quality 
and sufficiency of systems, infrastructure and practices. 
 
Board Size and Independent Directors (Recommendation 4): The Committee 
emphasized on the independence of directors, who should act as the fiduciaries of 
shareholders and not of the management. The Committee recommended for the 
appointment of an independent director on the board of directors. Minimum size of the 
board should be seven out of which four should be independent directors of listed 
companies. The independent directors should not be less than 50% of the board. 
 
Independent director has been defined as a non-executive director who does not have any 
pecuniary relationship or transactions with the company, or its promoters, or its senior 
management and its holding or subsidiary company. There are seven more negative 
covenants: 
 
(i) He is not related to promoters or management; 
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(ii) He has not been an executive of the company in the last three years; 
 
(iii) He is neither a partner nor an executive of the audit, internal audit, legal firm 
or any consulting firm associated with the company for the last three years; 
 
(iv) He is not a significant supplier, vendor or customer of the company; 
 
(v) He is not a shareholder of a company owning 2% or more voting shares; 
 
(vi) He has not been any type of director of company for more than nine years; 
 
(vii) He is not a nominee director. 
 
The requirement of independent director is applicable to all public companies that have 
capital and free reserves of Rs.10 crores or turnover of Rs. 50 crores. However, it is not 
applicable to unlisted public companies, which have not more than 50 shareholders and 
are without any debt from public, banks and financial institutions or to unlisted 
subsidiaries of listed companies. According to current listing norms, institutional 
directors on the board of companies should be considered as independent whether the 
institution is an investing institution or a lending institution. The institutional directors 
have same rights, duties, and responsibilities as other members of the board and as 
prescribed by Companies Act and listing norms. 
 
Board Meeting by Tele or Video conferencing (Recommendation 4.5): A director may 
participate in the board meeting by teleconference or videoconference, if it is not possible 
for him to be physically present. However, minutes of all such meetings should be signed 
and confirmed by the concerned director. 
 
Constitution of Audit Committee (Recommendation 4.7): Audit Committees of all 
listed companies as well as unlisted public companies, with a paid-up share capital and 
free reserves of Rs. 100 million )10 crores) and above, or turnover of Rs. 500 million (50 
crores) and above should consist exclusively of independent directors. The role and 
function of audit committee should be clearly laid down in an audit committee charter. 
The chairperson of the audit committee must certify the date and frequency of meetings, 
to what extent functions listed in the charter were discharged, task performed, 
committee’s views on adequacy of internal control systems, perceptions of risks, why 
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financial statements with qualifications accepted and recommended, whether the 
committee met with the statutory and internal auditors without the presence of 
management and whether such meetings revealed materially significant issues or risks. 
 
Remuneration and Exemption of Non-executive (Independent) directors 
(Recommendations 4.9 and 4.10): The present provisions of stock options and one 
percent commission on net profits as remuneration to an independent director is found to 
be adequate by the Committee. It recommended that loss making companies should be 
permitted by the DCA to pay special fee to independent directors. Such directors should 
be exempted from criminal and civil liabilities relating to company. 
 
Training of Independent Directors (Recommendation 4.11): Independent directors are 
required to attend one training course before assuming responsibilities as an independent 
director. However, during initial years, they may undergo training within one year of 
becoming director. An untrained director should be disqualified. 
 
Corporate Serious Fraud Office: The Committee realized that the fraudsters are 
enemies of both the stakeholders that they cheat, and the corporate sector, which loses 
because the fraudsters scare away existing and potential investors. The Committee, 
therefore, suggested for setting up a Corporate Serious Fraud Office (CSFO) on the lines 
of the US corporate frauds task force, without taking away the powers of investigation 
and prosecution from existing agencies at this stage, in the DCA. The Corporate Serious 
Fraud Office should be constituted as a multi-disciplinary team, which will not only 
cover fraud, but also direct and supervise prosecutions under various economic 
legislations through appropriate agencies. 
 
 
5. Analysis of the Recommendations of the Narayana Murthy Committee 
 
This Committee on Corporate Audit and Governance was constituted by SEBI in 2002, to 
evaluate the adequacy of existing corporate governance practices and further improve 
these practices. The Committee was comprised of members from various walks of public 
and professional life. This included captains of industry, academicians, public 
accountants and people from financial press and from industry journals. The issues 
discussed by the Committee primarily related to audit committees, audit reports, 
independent directors, related parties, risk management, directorship and director 
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compensation, codes of conduct and financial disclosures. The Committee submitted its 
report on 8 February 2003. 
 
The Committee took note of the recommendations of the Naresh Chandra Committee and 
based on that made mandatory and non-mandatory recommendations. The key mandatory 
recommendations focus on strengthening the responsibilities of audit committees; 
improving the quality of financial disclosures, including those related to party 
transactions and disclosure of use proceeds from initial public offerings; requiring 
corporate executive boards to assess and disclose business risks in the annual reports of 
companies; introducing responsibilities on boards to adopt formal codes of conduct; the 
position of nominee directors; and stockholder approval and improved disclosures 
relating to compensation paid to non-executive directors. 
 
Non-mandatory recommendations included moving to a regime where corporate financial 
statements are not qualified; instituting a system of training of board members; and the 
evaluation of performance of board members. 
 
The Committee believed that it was necessary to codify certain standards of good 
governance into specific requirements, since certain corporate responsibilities are too 
important to be left to loose concepts of fiduciary responsibility. When implemented 
through SEBI’s regulatory framework, they will strengthen existing governance practices 
and also provide a strong incentive to avoid corporate failures. The Committee felt that 
the regulator should clearly define regulations and be able to effectively enforce the 
recommendations. The regulations should be as few as possible and the role of the 
regulator should primarily be that of a catalyst in enforcement. The mandatory 
recommendations of the Committee are: 
 
Composition of the Board of Directors: The Committee recommended that board should 
have an optimum combination of executive and non-executive directors with not less than 
fifty percent of the board comprising the non-executive directors. In case a company has 
a non-executive chairman, at least one-third of board should comprise of independent 
directors, and in case a company has an executive chairman, at least half of the board 
should be independent. The nominee directors should have the same responsibilities and 
be subject to same discipline and be accountable to shareholders as any other director of 
the company. 
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Constitution and Functions of Audit Committee: A qualified and independent audit 
committee should be set-up by the board to enhance the credibility of the financial 
disclosures and promoting transparency. Members of audit committee should be 
‘financially literate’ (ability to read and understand basic financial statements) and at 
least one member should have ‘accounting or related financial management expertise’, 
i.e., he must have requisite professional qualification or experience and background in 
finance or accounting or have been CEO, CFO or other senior officer with financial 
responsibilities. Audit Committee of public listed companies should review the following 
information mandatorily: 
 
(i) Financial statements and draft audit report including quarterly/ half-yearly 
financial information; 
 
(ii) Management discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of 
operations; 
 
(iii) Reports relating to compliance with laws and risk management; 
 
(iv) Management letters/ letters of internal control weaknesses issued by 
statutory/internal auditors; 
 
(v) Records of related party transactions; 
 
(vi) The appointment, removal and terms of remuneration of the chief internal 
auditor. 
 
Disclosure of Accounting treatment and Audit Qualifications: If a company has 
followed a different treatment than the one prescribed in an accounting standard, 
independent/statutory auditors should justify why they believe such alternative treatment 
is more representative of the underlying business transaction. Management should also 
clearly explain the alternative accounting treatment in the footnotes to the financial 
statements. Companies should be encouraged to move towards a regime of unqualified 
financial statements. SEBI and stock exchanges should give a reasonable time to the 
company to acquire the necessary qualifications. 
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Related Party Transactions: The Committee noted that a statement disclosing the 
basis/methodology for various types of transactions entered into with related parties 
should be prepared and submitted for the information of the audit committee. It also 
opined that this statement should include transactions which are not on an arm’s length 
principle. The company’s management should explain to the audit committee the reasons 
for the non-arm’s length nature of the transaction. The Committee recommended that a 
statement of all transactions with related parties including their bases should be placed 
before the independent audit committee for approval/ ratification; and if any transaction 
is not on arm’s length basis then management should provide an explanation to the audit 
committee justifying the same. The term ‘related party’ has the same meaning as 
contained in Accounting Standard 18, Related Party Transactions, issued by the ICAI. 
 
Disclosure of Risk management to Board: As it is important for corporate board to be 
fully aware of the risks facing the business and also for shareholders to know about the 
process by which the companies manage their business risks, the committee, therefore, 
recommended that procedures should be in place to inform board members about the risk 
assessment and minimization procedures. These procedures should be periodically 
reviewed to ensure that executive management controls risk through means of a properly 
defined framework. Management should place a report before the board in each quarter, 
documenting the business risks faced by the company, measures taken to address and 
minimize such risks, and any limitations to the risk taking capacity of the company. The 
board should formally approve this document. 
 
Use of the Proceeds of IPO: Companies raising money through an Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) should disclose to the audit committee the use/ application of funds by 
capital expenditure, sales and marketing, working capital, etc. on a quarterly basis. On an 
annual basis, the company should prepare a statement of funds utilized for purposes other 
than those stated in the offer document/prospectus. The independent auditors should 
certify this statement. The audit committee should make appropriate recommendations to 
the board to take steps in this matter. The Committee noted that disclosure of unspecified 
uses of IPO proceeds would be a more transparent measure. 
 
Written Code of Conduct for the Board and Executive management: The Committee 
taking note that the Kumar Manglam Birla Committee Report had defined the broad roles 
and responsibilities of management, recommended that it is obligatory for board to lay 
down the code of conduct for all board members and senior management of the company 
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and not just for senior financial personnel. This code of conduct is to be posted on the 
company’s website. Board members and senior management personnel should affirm 
compliance with the code on an annual basis. The annual report of the company shall 
contain a declaration to this effect signed by the CEO and COO. The Committee also 
recommended for the training of board members in learning. The business model as well 
as the risk profile of the business parameters of their company. 
 
Restriction on Nominee Directors: The Committee recommended that there shall be no 
nominee directors. Where an institution or the government wishes to appoint nominee 
director on the board, such appointment should be made by the shareholders. Such 
nominee directors shall have the same responsibilities and liabilities as any other director. 
 
Definition, Qualification and Compensation of Independent and non-executive 
Directors: This Committee adopted the same definition as formulated by the Naresh 
Chandra Committee, however, without the condition of maximum term of nine years. 
Compensation payable to the directors must be fixed by the board and approved by the 
shareholders in the general meeting. Maximum limit should be set for stock options in 
any financial year and in aggregate. Compensation philosophy and statement of entitled 
compensation to the non-executive directors should be published in the annual report of 
the company, together with the details of shares held. Non-executive directors are 
required to disclose their stock holding (both own and held on beneficial basis) in the 
listed company in which they are proposed to be appointed, prior to their appointment. 
This disclosure should also accompany their notice of appointment. 
 
Evaluation of the performance of non-executive directors: The peer group comprising 
the entire board, excluding the director being evaluated, should make the performance 
evaluation of non-executive directors. This peer group evaluation should be the 
mechanism to determine whether to extend/continue the terms of appointment of non-
executive directors. 
 
Whistle Blower Policy: An important and controversial recommendation of the 
committee is the whistle blower policy, i.e., personnel who observe any unethical or 
improper practice (not necessarily a violation of law) in the company should be able to 
approach the audit committee without informing their supervisors. Company shall take 
measures to ensure that this right of access is communicated to all employees through 
means of internal circulars, etc. The employment and other personnel policies of the 
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company shall contain provisions protecting such ‘whistle blowers’ from unfair 
termination and other unfair prejudicial employment practices. Further, companies should 
annually affirm that they have not denied any personnel access to the audit committee 
and have provided protection to the whistle blowers. The whistle blower policy, however, 
does not provide any mechanism against the frivolous complaints. 
 
Audit Committee of Subsidiary Companies: The Committee took the view to extend 
the requirements relating to non-executive/independent directors and audit committees to 
subsidiaries of listed companies. It recommended that the provisions relating to 
composition of the board of the holding company shall be applicable to subsidiary 
company. At least one independent director of the board of holding company shall be on 
the board of subsidiary company. The audit committee of the parent company shall also 
review the financial statements, particularly the investments made by the subsidiary 
company. The minutes of board meetings of the subsidiary company shall be placed for 
review at the board meeting of the parent company. The board’s report of the parent 
company should state that they have also reviewed the affairs of the subsidiary company. 
The Committee also recommended that central government should amend the Companies 
Act, 1956 to exclude common directorships in holding and subsidiary companies, in 
computing the limits on directorship that an individual may hold. 
 
Real time disclosures (Disclosure of critical business events): It was suggested that 
SEBI should issue rules relating to disclosure of certain transactions or events that may 
be of importance to investors such as a change in the control of the company; a 
company’s acquisition/disposal of a significant amount of assets; bankruptcy; a change in 
the company’s auditors; and the resignation of a director. However, the Committee noted 
that there are certain practical problems in ensuring timely disclosure, so it made no 
recommendation in this respect. 
 
 
6. Emerging Trends from the Recommendation of both the Committees 
 
The recommendations of both the Committees, the Naresh Chandra Committee and the 
Narayana Murthy Committee, shall have far reaching effects on the management of 
corporate organizations, the audit firms and norms of corporate governance. Based on 
these recommendations, some of the changes in Companies Act, 1956 are perceived: 
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(1) Re-classification of Public companies into three categories: 
(i) Public company having a paid up share capital and free reserves of Rs 50 
millions or more or a turnover of Rs 500 millions or more - such companies 
should have a minimum number of seven directors out of which majority 
should be independent. 
 
(ii) Public companies having less share capital plus free reserves or turnover than 
the above mentioned; 
 
(iii) Unlisted Public companies having no more than fifty shareholders. 
 
(2) New disqualifications for independent director 
The list of disqualifications is too long and also harsh. It would be difficult to find 
suitable independent directors. Furthermore, a person holding 2% or more shares in a 
company is disqualified. By virtue of his stake in a company, a director shall expect the 
company to prosper so that he may get a good return on his investment and he would like 
to contribute to this. 
 
(3) More restrictions on Auditors: 
In future, auditor’s appointment shall be subject to the terms and conditions ‘as may be 
prescribed’, and the auditor shall give a written certificate that he fulfills the conditions. 
To assure auditor independence and to ensure arm’s length distance between auditor and 
auditee company, certain disqualifications have been proposed. The fine of punishment 
for the auditor who is in default has been increased to three times of total remuneration or 
fifty thousands or whichever is more. 
 
(4) Composition of the Board of Directors: 
The composition of the board is important as it determines the ability of the board to 
collectively provide the leadership and ensures that no individual or group is able to 
dominate the board. In India, the board is a combination of executive directors, with their 
intimate knowledge of business, and of outside, non-executive directors, who can bring 
broader view to the company’s activities, under the chairman who accepts the duties and 
responsibilities which the post entails. The executive directors are involved in the day-to-
day management of companies; the non-executive directors bring external and wider 
perspective and independence to the decision-making. Till recently, it has been the 
practice of most of the companies to fill the board with representatives of the promoters 
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of the company, and independent directors were also handpicked and thereby ceasing to 
be independent. This has undergone a change and increasingly the boards comprise of 
following group of directors – promoter directors, executive directors and non-executive 
directors. Some of them are independent. 
 
The corporate legislation in India stipulates that the directors of companies should be 
natural persons and also stipulates the qualifications for appointment of a person as a 
director. The legislation further provides that a private limited company should have a 
minimum of two directors and a public limited company a minimum of three directors. 
 
In regard to the composition of the board, Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement provides 
that “the Boards shall have an optimum combination of executive and non-executive 
directors with not less than fifty percent of the board of directors comprising of non-
executive directors. The number of independent directors would depend whether the 
Chairman is executive or non-executive. In case of a non-executive chairman, at least 
one-third of the board should comprise of independent directors, and in case of an 
executive chairman, at least half of the board should comprise of independent directors”. 
The expression ‘independent director’ here means directors who apart from receiving 
director’s remuneration, do not have any other material pecuniary relationship or 
transactions with the company, its promoters, its management or its subsidiaries, which, 
in the judgment of the board may affect independence of judgment of the director. Thus, 
composition of board is one of the tools of corporate governance. 
 
(i) Who Appoint the Directors: Generally, shareholders of a company appoint the 
directors. However, section 255 of the Companies Act provides that 1/3 of the total 
number of directors could be those who are not liable to retire by rotation. Such directors 
include nominee directors, debenture directors, non-rotational directors appointed by 
board by virtue of powers under the Articles of the company. A director could be 
appointed and removed by an ordinary resolution. Thus, technically a group of persons 
controlling one share more than 50% of the shares could control the composition of the 
board for they will be in a position to get their nominees elected as directors whether they 
are executive, non-executive or independent. In order to ensure participation of all 
shareholders in the decision-making process in respect of important matters, the 
legislature has provided for the system of postal ballot. Likewise, in order to ensure 
effectively that all shades of opinion constituting the company are represented on board, 
87
company’s Articles should provide that the directors are elected by the principle of 
proportional representation as provided under section 265 of the Act. 
 
(ii) Can Non-resident be appointed as Directors?: Under the Indian laws, the whole body 
of directors of a company could comprise of non-residents. Furthermore, the Companies 
Act does not stipulate that the board meetings of companies incorporated in India should 
be held only in India. Thus, directors may look after the business from abroad and board 
meeting could be held abroad. Thereby, the necessity of the directors of such companies 
coming to India could be minimized or absent. 
 
Directors are deemed to be officers in default under certain situations and they are also 
liable to penal offences for omissions and commissions under various provisions of the 
Act and other laws of the country. Thus, if all the directors of a company are non-resident, 
then it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the law to reach them. Some countries 
stipulate that one or more directors of a company should be a resident of the country in 
which the company is incorporated. 
 
Neither the Companies Act nor Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement dealing with 
corporate governance provides that a company must have a director resident in India. It is, 
therefore, necessary to provide in relation to the composition of the board that at least one 
director should ordinarily be resident in India. It is particularly so because of the opening 
up of the Indian economy wherein number of MNCs are incorporating new companies in 
India as subsidiaries or otherwise and may provide in their Articles that all directors 
could be non-residents. 
 
(iii) Maximum Number of Directors: With regard to composition of the Board, the 
Companies Act fixes maximum number of directors to 12 which a company can have. If 
any company desires to have more then the maximum than it could do so only with the 
approval of the central government. The interference of the government for fixing the 
maximum is not understood. The corporate sector in India now consists of giant 
companies such as Reliance, Maruti, Indian Oil Corporation etc and MNCs are also 
entering, so the promoters, the management and shareholders should be given the 
freedom to fix the strength of the board. Certainly, while fixing the maximum number, 
they will take into account the business needs of the company and other related matters. 
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(iv) New Grounds of Disqualification of Directors:18 Whenever a company fails to file 
the annual accounts and annual returns for a continuous three financial years; or fails to 
repay its deposits or interest thereon on due date; or fails to redeem its debentures on due 
date; or fails to pay declared dividend for continuous one year, then the persons who are 
directors on the last date of these defaults shall be disqualified. They shall also not be 
eligible for appointment as a director in any other public company for a period of five 
years. It shall be the duty of statutory auditor to report to the members whether any 
director is disqualified. He shall also furnish a certificate each year as to whether on the 
basis of examination of the books and records any director of the company is disqualified. 
The company shall also file a return with the Registrar of Companies (ROC) furnishing 
the names and addresses of such directors. If the company fails to file this return, the 
officers of the company shall be in default. The ROC shall place one copy of it in the 
document file for public inspection and shall forward other copy to the central 
government. The central government shall place these details on the web-site of the DCA. 
 
(v) Board Committees: Board committees carry out most of the board functions. The 
important committees are nominating, remuneration and audit committees. These 
committees are composed of non-executive directors. The minimum size of an audit 
committee recommended in India is three members, another requirement is time required 
by audit committee members and the importance of written terms of reference. 
 
(vi) Rise in directors sitting fee: The government has raised the sitting fee of the board 
directors of 27 Public Sector Undertaking (PSUs) banks from Rs 1000-5000 per sitting. 
This goes in line with the trend in the corporate sector where the non-executive directors 
are now recompensed through higher sitting fee, commissions and other fee. 
 
(vii) Chairman and Managing Director – held by a single person: A sizeable number of 
Indian companies combine the role of chairman and managing director. In about 34% of 
the BSE 200 companies, a single person, commonly referred as the Chairman and 
Managing Director (CMD), holds these positions. If we consider the cases where the 
relatives held these two posts, then the percentage rises to a whooping 41%. Seventy-four 
percent of the government held companies had the CMD posts held by a single person. In 
the United States, 80% of its S&P 500 companies combine these roles; while in the UK 
90% of its listed companies separate these roles.19
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Studies have shown that a majority of corporate failures were predominantly a result of 
misuse of power by one or more individuals, occupying a position of trust, who apart 
from causing loss of large amounts of money have also committed illegal acts. One of the 
most accepted ways that could curb misuse is by assigning the roles of chairman and 
CEO to different individuals. The intention is to separate the responsibilities of a MD, 
who is involved in the day-to-day activities of the organization from that of a chairman, 
who would also be concerned about the stockholder’s interest. 
 
Post-Enron, the pattern in CEO holding office of Chairman in the US is also changing 
rapidly. According to CFO.com in 2003, over 27 shareholder resolutions have been 
moved to split the roles of a chairman and CEO, while in 2002 there were only 4 such 
instances. The following Table illustrates the position in India: 
 
BSE 30 Chairman 
Companies and MD 
Bajaj Auto Rahul Bajaj 
 
BHEL KG Ramachandran 
BSES Anil Ambani 
Cipla YK Hamied 
HCL Tech Shiv Nadar 
MTNL Narinder Sharma 
Nestle Carlo M V Donati 
Reliance Mukesh Ambani 
ZEE Subhash Chandra 
 
 
 
(5) Mergers & Acquisitions: 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) serve as a vital instrument of corporate governance to 
increase corporate efficiency. M&As provide the platform where corporate ethos, 
minority rights protection, cultural conditions, regulatory environment and other 
contentious issues are tested over times. The economic reforms have resulted in a radical 
change in the process of corporate control and other forms of restructuring. 
 
Two particular circumstances discourage M&As in India, viz., (1) the financial 
institutions had a high stake in the equity and they do not encourage takeovers, (ii)the 
existence of restrictive provisions in the laws do not encourage takeovers. For example, 
sections 372 and 108 of the Companies Act put limit on the extent of equity purchasable 
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by a company in other company and refusal to register transfer of shares by the board of 
target company for reasons “in the interest” of the company. Now, section 372A20 has 
been inserted which has brought a sea change in the investment limit. 
 
The regulatory bodies have amended the listing agreement and appropriate amendments 
to takeover code. According to takeover regulations, the raider has to inform the stock 
exchanges once his holdings cross five percent in a particular targeted company. Further, 
when holdings cross ten percent, the buyer has to make an offer to buy another twenty 
percent of the shares from the public. 
 
Amended clause 40B of Takeover Code provides that the takeover offer shall be placed 
in the first instance before the board of directors of the offeree company and shall contain 
detailed information. The Code allows the board of directors to offer an independent view 
on the pricing. A company board can tell shareholders that the price offered is 
unattractive and not to accept the offer unless it is improved. It restrains the board of the 
offeree company from issuing any authorized but unissued shares or to sell and dispose 
off assets of substantial amount without approval of the general body. SEBI makes it 
mandatory for corporate raiders to divulge their source of funds; whether the funds have 
come from domestic or foreign sources. This is to ensure to track that who are behind 
such bids. 
 
Under section 29(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, the Competition Commission of India 
(CCI) can issue a notice to the parties of a combination, which it considers to be anti-
competitive. Under section 29(2), the CCI may require the parties to publish the details of 
the combination. 
 
The year 2003 was also the beginning for Indian companies venturing abroad. The year 
saw a sudden spate of overseas acquisitions by Indian companies, now confident of their 
engineering and technological skills. Corporates had an estimated free cash flow of Rs.23, 
000 crore as on March 31, 2003. This had been achieved by adopting discipline in capital 
expenditure, cost cutting, better working capital management and reducing debt level. In 
addition, the government restrictions on overseas acquisitions have been eased and at the 
same time foreign exchange is no longer a constraint. Thus, Indian companies have 
restructured significantly and have the necessary balance-sheet strength to under- take 
inorganic growth. However, according to the KPMG study, the total value of merger and 
acquisition deals in India had fallen by a whopping 42%. According to this study, the 
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total M&A deals value for the year 2003 is $ 3.7 billion as compared to $ 6.5 billion in 
2002. This is because there are still host of restrictions on acquisitions beyond prescribed 
limits by foreign or domestic investors in banking and insurance sectors. 
 
(6) Disclosure Requirements: 
Disclosure compensates for the absence of a body of knowledgeable shareholders able to 
sit on boards of directors or otherwise to act as proxies for shareholders generally. 
Disclosures by companies are not an end in themselves and can not be a substitute for 
corporate integrity, nevertheless, they are useful. Disclosure is highly regulated under 
securities laws. However, there is a room for voluntary disclosure beyond what is 
mandated by law. Disclosures from corporate India have been improving, egged on by 
regulations, guidelines, international laws and global practices. Indian companies and 
regulators have realized that better disclosures invariable lead to better value creation. 
Corporate announcement put on stock exchange websites proves that there is an 
improvement in disclosures, both in quantity and quality. Material developments about 
key decisions are reported within reasonable time periods to stock exchanges. Promoters 
buying and selling options, grants of options, changes in directors, limited review 
statements are some of the data now made available to investors. 
 
Directors are required to disclose their own relevant interests, and to disclose company’s 
financial performance in an annual periodical report to shareholders. It is the board’s 
responsibility to disclose accurate information about the financial performance of the 
company, as well as, information about agenda items, prior to general meeting of 
shareholders. 
 
Company law and SEBI regulations place heavy emphasis on financial reporting 
obligations of the board, as well as the board oversight of the audit function. This is 
because they are key to investor confidence and the integrity of markets. The key 
development in the year 2003 was making available consolidated accounts for all 
companies. This does away with the opacity that existed in the form of a web of 
subsidiaries and joint ventures, with little information on the impact of these on the health 
of the holding company. Unraveling inter-company transactions and the true picture of 
profitability is now possible, which is an invaluable tool for shareholders. Further, in 
annual reports, companies now disclose related party transactions that highlight whether 
there are material transactions by the company with either promoters or their group 
companies. Further, managements have to disclose that an alternative accounting 
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treatment has been followed while preparing accounts, and also have to explain as to why 
that method was adopted by the company. 
 
A series of changes will also be coming from March 2004 onwards. Listed public 
companies will have to institute a whistle blower policy that will encourage employees to 
disclose knowledge of management fraudulent activity in the company and board and 
they will be protected for such disclosures against discrimination or unfair termination. 
Another disclosure that takes it roots from Sarbanes-Oxley legislation of the US, is the 
CEO and CFO certification of accounts. Annual reports will feature a certificate from the 
CEO and CFO, in which they will affirm that financial statements do not contain any 
misleading statements, they comply with laws, the company has not committed illegal 
acts and that they have kept auditors aware of incidents of fraud. This shall put direct 
onus on the executives unlike the current annual reports, where directors take 
responsibility and the scope is not as wide. 
 
(7) Employee Stock Option Scheme (ESOP) Norms:21
SEBI has proposed changes in revised guidelines for the employee’s stock option and 
stock purchase scheme. These guidelines were made on June 30,2003. Companies are 
now allowed to obtain an “in principle’ listing approval in advance from stock exchanges 
to minimize the time lag between the allotment of shares (on exercise of options) and 
consequent listing of shares. The companies can file statements regarding ESOPs, 
anytime after the grant of options and before vesting of options. The same statement 
could be filed with depositories like National Securities Depository. In an effort to 
provide stock exchanges greater control over the stock option schemes, additional 
disclosures are required, for example, the number of securities reserved for ESOP, the 
total number of securities issued on cumulative basis and balance securities yet to be 
issued. SEBI also asks merchant bankers to ensure that ESOP scheme adhere to norms 
and should certify the correctness of disclosures. However, SEBI’s norms on preferential 
allotment would not be applicable to shares issued under ESOP and stock purchase plans. 
 
(8) New System to Track Price Rigging On Stock Exchanges: 
SEBI is taking the integrated surveillance system for alerts on share price rigging. The 
proposal is being pursued under the US Aid Programme. The surveillance system is being 
upgraded which will help the market watchdog to immediately identify market operators 
inducing unnatural share price movements. A similar system is in use at NYSE and 
Nasdaq. Under the proposal, the system will link the regulator and stock exchanges and 
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enable it to capture data on transactions in both cash and derivative sections, providing 
SEBI with a platform to take pro-active action against potential market manipulators. The 
Joint Parliamentary Committee probing the stock market scam in its report in December 
2002, mooted the proposal for the establishment of an integrated surveillance system. 
 
(9) Participation of women in company’s Board: 
While Indian companies are loudly articulating the importance of women as consumers 
and decision-makers, the fact is that corridors of corporate power are still completely out 
of bound for women. The corporates, however, plead that appointment on board should 
based on the competence of a person and not on the basis of gender. 
 
The CMIE (Center for Monitoring of Indian Economy)22 data about Board Composition 
shows that out of 2,079 board positions in the 200 Bombay Stock Exchange listed 
companies, only 43 positions were filled by women, and after discounting multiple 
representations, there are 28 women who are directors on the boards of BSE 200 
companies. Only 17% companies have any women on the board. This makes up that only 
two out of every 100 board members in India’s top companies are women. The private 
sector lags far behind the public sector. Furthermore, almost all the women on boards are 
either from the public sector, or from the promoter’s families. 
 
The Reliance Group and the Tatas have just one woman on the board across all their 
Group companies. The Aditya Birla group, the Bajaj group, and the Lalbhai group have 
the most feminine representation on their boards - with 3 each. The Essar, Kirloskar, 
Mahindra & Mahindra, and Bombay Dyeing group have no representation of women. 
 
The Naresh Chandra Committee Report recommended for the appointment of women 
directors on the company boards, but surprisingly the Companies (Amendment) Act 2002 
did not incorporate any provision to this effect. The Companies Amendment Bill 2003 
(now withdrawn) had proposed to increase the representation of women on the 
companies’ boards. 
 
(10) National Foundation for Corporate governance: 
The Government approved the setting up of a National Foundation for Corporate 
Governance as part of the effort to sensitize corporate leaders on the importance of good 
corporate governance, self-regulation and directorial responsibilities. The foundation will 
provide a platform to deliberate issues relating to good corporate governance. It will also 
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provide research, training standard and capacity building and related support in the field 
of corporate governance. The government will provide a one-time grant of Rs 10 crore 
while the CII (Confederation of Indian Industries) will chip in 3 crore and the ICAI, ICSI 
will contribute Rs 1 crore each. 
 
(11) Revised Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement: 
SEBI revised clause 49 of the Listing Agreement to introduce corporate governance in 
August 2003, but has now deferred its implementation.23 Revised clause 49 shall apply to 
all listed companies in accordance with the schedule given in a phased manner. All 
requirements are mandatory except, those given in Annexure IC. Such companies are also 
required to submit a quarterly compliance report to the stock exchanges through their 
compliance officer or CEO. The stock exchanges shall ensure that all provisions of 
corporate governance have been complied. They shall set-up monitoring cell to monitor 
the compliance with the provisions of corporate governance. The cell shall obtain the 
quarterly report from the companies and submit a consolidated compliance report to 
SEBI. The recommended clause 49 is based on recommendations of Kumar Manglam 
Birla Committee and Narayana Murthy Committee has proposed certain changes. The 
amended clause 49 is being further modified by SEBI in light of suggestions received by 
the SEBI. The text of clause 49 is appended to this study at the end. 
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